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2001; Buzsaki and Draguhn, 2004; Cohen et al., 2007). Further, 
  synchronized oscillations across brain regions have been linked to 
conditioning and choice behavior (Pesaran et al., 2008; Sauseng 
and Klimesch, 2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Popescu et al., 2009). Here 
we examined whether long-range   neurophysiological oscillatory 
synchrony is a plausible mechanism by which the MFC engages 
top-down control over sensory processing following errors.
The adaptive change in cognitive control that occurs after 
errors has traditionally been conceptualized as an effortful process, 
requiring conscious awareness that an error was made or negative 
performance feedback was given. However, conscious awareness 
may not be necessary for all aspects of cognitive control. Indeed, 
non-consciously perceived conﬂ   ict or error signals modulate 
activity in the motor system (Dehaene et al., 1998) and prefrontal 
 cortex (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Hester et al., 2005; Endrass et al., 
2007; Klein et al., 2007; Ursu et al., 2009). Moreover, some aspects 
of high-level cognitive control, such as response inhibition and 
task-switching, may also occur in absence of conscious awareness 
(Lau and Passingham, 2007; van Gaal et al., 2008). However, such 
unconscious processes are thought to be ephemeral, lasting only a 
few hundred milliseconds (Greenwald et al., 1996; Rossetti, 1998; 
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). The extent to which unconsciously 
made errors can engage top-down control remains unknown.
We recorded EEG from human subjects while they performed a 
visually signaled Go/No-Go task, in which one half of the No-Go 
cues were presented in a way that evaded conscious awareness. We 
examined oscillatory phase synchrony – a measure of   frequency-
band speciﬁ  c functional connectivity – between the MFC and 
occipital cortex (OCC) on correctly responded Go trials that 
  followed conscious errors, unconscious errors, or other correct 
INTRODUCTION
Throughout life, we try to improve our performance on goal-directed 
tasks, in part by learning from our previous mistakes. Monitoring 
our actions for errors and ﬁ  ne-tuning performance accordingly is 
a key function of the cognitive control system, a neural network in 
which the medial prefrontal cortex (MFC) plays a prominent and 
crucial role (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a; Carter and van Veen, 2007). 
Myriad studies spanning several species have implicated the MFC 
in action monitoring, conﬂ  ict detection, error signaling, and rein-
forcement learning (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Carter and van Veen, 
2007). Generally, these studies show that MFC activity increases 
following errors or negative feedback (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a,b). 
MFC activity also predicts adjustments in  performance or decision-
making in the subsequent trial (Gehring et al., 1993; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2003; Debener et al., 2005; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; 
Gentsch et al., 2009), although this pattern is not always observed 
(Gehring and Fencsik, 2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001).
And yet, little is known about the neurobiological  mechanisms by 
which processes in the MFC can lead to adjustments in  performance. 
Researchers using fMRI (Egner and Hirsch, 2005) have revealed that 
activity in regions involved in task-relevant stimulus processing is 
enhanced following errors or conﬂ  icts. This is in line with a large 
body of evidence revealing preparatory top-down modulatory 
effects in visual cortex when attentional demands are increased 
(Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Pessoa et al., 2003). We hypothesize 
that this top-down control is realized through synchronized elec-
trophysiological oscillations (Cavanagh et al., 2009). Oscillations 
reﬂ  ect rhythmic ﬂ  uctuations in population-level dendritic activity 
and action potentials, and accompany memory, decision-  making, 
and other cognitive processes (Klimesch, 1999; Engel et  al., 
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Go trials. Enhanced MFC–OCC synchrony occurred on trials 
 following unconscious and conscious errors, and predicted subjects’ 
behavioral performance. Pre-trial synchrony was dominated by an 
MFC → OCC directional ﬂ  ow; OCC → MFC directed synchrony 
was maximal following stimulus onset and was unrelated to errors 
in the previous trial. These ﬁ  ndings suggest that the MFC uses syn-
chronized oscillations to entrain sensory regions following errors 
to improve sensory processing. Further, these ﬁ  ndings demonstrate 
that top-down control over sensory cortex occurs even when errors 
are made unconsciously.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Subjects were 15 right-handed undergraduate psychology stu-
dents (14 female) at the University of Amsterdam, with normal or 
  corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects gave written informed con-
sent prior to participation, and the experiment was approved by 
the local ethical committee. Non-overlapping results from these 
subjects have been reported elsewhere (van Gaal et al., 2008).
STIMULI
Stimuli were presented on a gray box (59.1 cd/m2, visual angle of 
3.78°) against a black background (2.17 cd/m2) at the center of a 
15-inch BenQ TFT monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The moni-
tor was placed at a distance of approximately 90 cm in front of the 
participant, so that each centimeter subtended a visual angle of 0.64°. 
Participants were told that they would see a black annulus (the Go 
signal, 2.17 cd/m2, visual angle of 1.30°, duration 100 ms) and that 
they would have to respond as quickly as possible by pressing a button 
with their right index ﬁ  nger. Participants were instructed to with-
hold their response when they perceived a gray circle (the No-Go 
signal, 41.85 cd/m2, visual angle of 0.60°, duration 16.7 ms) preceding 
the Go signal. The stimulus onset asynchrony between the No-Go 
signal and the Go signal was either 16.7 ms or 83 ms. The No-Go 
circle exactly ﬁ  tted within the Go annulus, which typically results in 
 efﬁ  cient metacontrast masking. Trial duration was jittered between 
1400 and 2200 ms (in steps of 200 ms), randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution, rendering the presentation of the stimuli 
temporally unpredictable. Participants were not informed about the 
presence of the unconscious No-Go cue and received no feedback 
about performance on these trials during testing. The experiment was 
programmed with Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, 
USA). There were seven blocks of 200 trials each (140 Go, 30 con-
scious No-Go, and 30 unconscious No-Go). The average number 
(and standard deviation) of trials included in the EEG analyses for 
Go following Go trials, Go following conscious errors, and Go fol-
lowing unconscious errors, was 654 (34), 53 (15), and 142 (8). The 
minimum number of trials for any subject was 29.
EXPERIMENT CONDITIONS
We distinguished three types of trials: Go trials following cor-
rect Go trials (“Go”); Go trials following trials that contained a 
visible No-Go cue, but in which subjects committed a response 
(“conscious errors”); and Go trials following trials that contained 
a masked No-Go cue, but in which subjects committed a response 
(“unconscious errors”) (see Figure 1A). Note that all trials included 
in the present analyses are Go trials, and that there was a response 
on the previous trial; differences among conditions lie solely in 
whether the previous trial contained a conscious, nonconscious, 
or no No-Go cue. Further, because the unconscious No-Go cue 
on the previous trial did not reach subjective awareness, Go trials 
following other Go trials are also identical to Go trials following 
unconscious errors in terms of the subjective experience. In other 
words, all trials included in these analyses, and the trials that pre-
ceded those, contained a stimulus and response.
VISIBILITY OF NO-GO SIGNALS
To test whether subjects were truly unaware of the unconscious 
No-Go signals, they performed two discrimination tasks after 
the main task. In both tasks, the stimulus display and trial timing 
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of task design and behavioral results. (A) Visual 
representation of trial events for the three conditions. Note that all data 
reported here are from correctly responded Go trials (“trial n”) in which the 
previous trial also contained a response, separated according to whether
 the previous trial contained a consciously visible No-Go cue (conscious error, 
top), an unconsciously presented No-Go cue (unconscious error, middle), 
or a Go cue (correct go, bottom). (B) Subjects were signiﬁ  cantly slower on Go 
trials following unconscious and conscious errors compared to Go trials 
following correct Go trials, over two behavioral testing sessions (1, 2), and the 
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were identical to the main task. In the ﬁ  rst yes/no detection task, 
the number of trials per condition was the same as one block in 
the Go/No-Go task (140 Go trials, 30 unconscious No-Go tri-
als, 30 conscious No-Go trials, pseudo-random order). However, 
  subjects were instructed to press a button only when they per-
ceived a No-Go signal. The hit rate of 2% on unconscious No-Go 
trials did not exceed the false alarm rate of 0.8% on Go trials (the 
hit rate on conscious No-Go trials was 93.3%). In the second, 
more conservative, forced-choice discrimination task (2 blocks 
of 100 trials), subjects were informed about the presence of a very 
brief No-Go signal shortly before the Go signal on some trials. No 
participants reported awareness of these No-Go signals during 
the Go/No-Go experiment. In this task, each block consisted of 
50 unconscious No-Go trials and 50 Go trials (pseudo-random 
order). Participants were instructed to press the left button when 
they thought a brief No-Go signal preceded the Go signal and to 
press the right button when they thought this was not the case. 
Participants were told that in 50% of all trials, a Go signal was 
preceded by a No-Go signal and were instructed to consider this in 
their response. Participants were unable to discriminate between 
Go trials and unconscious No-Go trials (d’ = 0.05, mean percent-
age correct = 51%), as evidenced by chance-level performance 
(p > 0.2 for both discrimination tasks, see van Gaal et al., 2008, 
for more details).
EEG RECORDING AND PROCESSING
EEG data were recorded at 256 Hz using a BioSemi ActiveTwo 
ampliﬁ  er from 48 scalp electrodes and 4 peri-occular electrodes. 
All analyses were conducted in Matlab, using in-house written code 
supplemented by EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) (inde-
pendent components analysis and topographical plotting) and 
BSMART (Cui et al., 2008) (spectral Granger causality estimates). 
Data were re-referenced off-line to the average of the activity 
recorded at the two ear lobes. All data were visually inspected, and 
trials containing artifacts were identiﬁ  ed and removed. Blink arti-
facts were removed from the data using independent   components 
analyses in EEGLAB.
One limitation of surface EEG is the spatial spread of large ﬁ  eld 
potentials through volume conduction. This limits interpretabil-
ity of inter-regional synchrony, because it is possible that strong 
synchrony results from the same deep sources projecting to mul-
tiple electrodes, and not to synchronous activity across spatially 
disparate brain regions. Current-source-density (CSD) transform 
acts as a high-pass spatial ﬁ  lter of voltage data, thus effectively sub-
tracting volume-conducted common activity due to deep and/or 
distant sources. CSD therefore measures superﬁ  cial cortical activity 
from the tissue lying directly underneath the electrode. The use of 
CSD transform has been validated for inter-regional synchrony 
(Srinivasan et al., 2007) as well as in cognitive control (Allain et al., 
2004; Cavanagh et al., 2009). Thus, EEG data were ﬁ  rst CSD trans-
formed (Kayser and Tenke, 2006). We note that despite increased 
spatial selectivity, precise anatomical localization remains uncer-
tain. For analyses with pooled data, unﬁ  ltered time-domain EEG 
data were averaged together from FC1, FCz, and FC2, and from 
O1, Oz, and O2. For convenience, we refer to these pooled elec-
trodes as MFC and OCC, respectively. Pooling data across several 
electrodes has the advantage of increasing signal-to-noise ratio and 
 minimizing any possible noise ﬂ  uctuations in a single electrode. We 
also conducted all analyses using a single electrode (FCz and Oz); 
the patterns of results were the same as those reported here.
PHASE SYNCHRONY ANALYSES
Phase synchrony was computed by ﬁ  rst extracting the phase angle 
time series from the data via complex Morlet wavelet convolu-
tion (Cavanagh et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2009), and computing 
the magnitude of the average phase angle difference between two 
electrodes over trials at each time/frequency point. Data were ﬁ  rst 
convolved with a family of complex Morlet wavelets, deﬁ  ned as 
ee
it f t 22 πσ −
22 /( ), where t is time and f is frequency, which increased 
from 2 to 60 Hz in 50 logarithmically spaced steps. σ deﬁ  nes the 
width of each frequency band, and was set according to 4/(2πf). 
Power is deﬁ  ned as the modulus of the resulting complex signal Zt 
[real(zt)2 + imag(zt)2], and phase angle is deﬁ  ned as arctan[imag(zt)/
real(zt)]. Inter-site phase synchrony (Lachaux et al., 1999) measures 
the extent to which oscillation phase angle differences between 
electrode pairs are consistent over trials at each time/frequency 
point, and varies from 0 (completely random phase angle differ-
ences across trials) to 1 (identical phase angle differences across 
trials): 
1
n ×
φφ Σ =
−
t
n i e
jt kt
1
[] , where n is the number of points, and φj 
and φk are the phase angles of electrodes j and k.
Statistics were conducted in two ways. First, we computed 
paired-sample t-tests on the differences between conditions in 
the 2–12 Hz band at each time point across subjects (Figure 2B). 
This frequency band was selected based on the condition-averaged 
synchrony plot (Figure 2B), and on the spectral Granger causal-
ity plots (Figure 5A). Temporal regions were highlighted if each 
time point achieved a signiﬁ  cance of at least p < 0.05, with at least 
156 ms (40 samples) of contiguously signiﬁ  cant p < 0.05 points. 
These analyses are mainly for illustration purposes. Results were 
conﬁ  rmed through repeated-measures ANOVAs, in which average 
synchrony was taken from three temporal windows (ﬁ  rst averaging 
from 2–12 Hz): −1200 to −300 ms preceding stimulus onset, 100 to 
300 post-stimulus onset (MFC–OCC synchrony peaked at 200 ms; 
we refer to this time window as “peak synchrony”), and 500 to 
1400 ms post-stimulus onset. These windows were selected, based 
on the timing of the experiment and on the synchrony results, to 
examine activity pre-trial, peak synchrony, and post-trial. Repeating 
the analyses using different time windows did not appreciably alter 
the results. Averaged data were entered into a 3 (condition) × 3 
(time window) repeated-measures ANOVA. Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction for nonsphericity was used; however, unadjusted degrees 
of freedom are reported for readability.
TOPOGRAPHICAL (WHOLE-HEAD) SYNCHRONY ANALYSES
In these analyses, phase synchrony was computed over trials 
between each possible electrode pair within a frequency band of 
2–12 Hz, as described above. Here, we extracted phase angles by 
applying the Hilbert transform to band-pass ﬁ  ltered data, which 
produces comparable results to wavelet convolution (Le Van Quyen 
et al., 2001), and is computationally simpler for analyses involv-
ing one a priori deﬁ  ned frequency band. To pool these data, we 
averaged the phase synchrony values for each condition among 
FC1, FCz, and FC2, and among O1, Oz, and O2. Statistics were 
performed by computing a paired-sample t-test across subjects at Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 54  |  4
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each electrode for differences between conditions. Any electrode 
that was not signiﬁ  cant at p < 2.22 × 10−5 (corresponding to 0.001 
with Bonferroni correction for 45 electrodes) was assigned a value 
of 0 (gray in Figures 4A,B).
SPECTRAL GRANGER CAUSALITY
Spectral Granger causality estimates the amount of variance in 
signal X that can be explained by variance in signal Y previously 
in time, at a particular frequency band. It was implemented here 
using Matlab code available in the BSMART toolbox (Cui et al., 
2008), which has previously been validated for neurophysiologi-
cal data (Zhang et al., 2008; Gaillard et al., 2009). Time-domain, 
unﬁ  ltered data from prefrontal and occipital sites were pooled 
prior to the analyses, as described above. Statistics were performed 
using a repeated-measures ANOVA, as described for the phase 
synchrony analyses. Because spectral Granger causality uses an 
autoregressive approach whereas oscillatory phase synchrony relies 
on consistency of phase values estimated from wavelet convolu-
tion, these methods provide converging evidence from different 
mathematical fronts.
BRAIN-BRAIN AND BRAIN-BEHAVIOR CORRELATIONS
For correlations between pre-trial and synchrony peak activity, we 
used robust regression (Holland and Welsch, 1977) as implemented 
in the statistics toolbox in Matlab. Robust regression uses an itera-
tive weighting least-squares approach to minimize the contribution 
of potential outliers, and therefore minimizes the possibility of 
ﬁ  nding statistically signiﬁ  cant relationships that are driven by a 
small number of data points.
For correlations between synchrony and task performance, we 
computed an “efﬁ  ciency” index (Townsend and Ashby, 1983) by 
dividing the response times during Go trials by one minus the 
proportion of errors on conscious No-Go trials (i.e., the inhibi-
tion rate). This provides a composite performance measure that 
takes into account both correct responses and successful inhibition 
rates. Response times from error trials were not included because 
they are faster than correct responses and thus may introduce bias. 
Correlations were computed using Spearman’s rho.
RESULTS
UNCONSCIOUS NO-GO CUES SLOW RESPONSE TIMES ON 
SUBSEQUENT TRIALS
Although the unconscious No-Go cue was not perceived, subjects 
were slower on Go trials following unconscious errors, compared to 
Go trials following Go trials (Figure 1B). Although small in magni-
tude (on average 3.1 ms), this effect was reliable across participants 
and testing sessions (F1,14 = 5.98; p = 0.028). Subjects also were 
slower on Go trials following conscious errors (on average 19.6 ms; 
F1,14 = 13.45; p = 0.003), which replicates many previous post-error 
slowing studies. Post-error slowing was greater following conscious 
compared to unconscious errors (F1,14 = 10.472, p = 0.006).
MFC–OCC SYNCHRONY FOLLOWING RESPONSE ERRORS
We examined oscillatory phase synchrony between a pool of pre-
frontal electrodes (FC1, FCz, and FC2; hereafter referred to as MFC) 
and a pool of occipital electrodes (O1, Oz, O2; hereafter referred 
to as OCC); pooling ensures high signal-to-noise and minimal 
chance of ﬁ  nding effects due to noise ﬂ  uctuations in any single 
electrode. Data were ﬁ  rst CSD transformed to maximize spatial 
resolution and minimize volume conduction (see Materials and 
Methods). When averaging across conditions, we found a strong 
“burst” of MFC–OCC synchrony around 100–400 ms following 
the onset of the Go stimulus, in a relatively broad low-frequency 
range of about 2–12 Hz (Figure 2A). Based on the experimental 
design and time-course of inter-site phase synchrony, we deﬁ  ned 
three time windows of interest for subsequent investigations: “pre-
trial” (−1200 to −300 ms before stimulus onset), “peak synchrony” 
(100 to 300 ms following stimulus onset; peak synchrony was 
observed at ∼200 ms), and “post-trial” (500 to 1400 ms following 
stimulus onset).
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FIGURE 2 | Oscillatory phase synchrony between prefrontal and occipital 
cortices was signiﬁ  cantly enhanced following unconscious and conscious 
errors. (A) Time-frequency plot of oscillatory phase synchrony averaged across all 
conditions demonstrates a “burst” of synchrony between a pool of medial frontal 
electrodes (MFC) and a pool of occipital electrodes (OCC) from around 2–12 Hz 
following the onset of the Go stimulus (data are converted to percent change from 
a −300 to −100 ms baseline at each frequency). (B) Oscillatory phase synchrony 
from 2–12 Hz plotted separately for each condition (values are the magnitude of 
the average projection vector over phase angle differences; see Materials and 
Methods). Phase synchrony was signiﬁ  cantly stronger following unconscious and 
conscious errors compared to Go trials, and was signiﬁ  cantly stronger following 
conscious compared to unconscious errors. Gray regions reﬂ  ect time windows in 
which at least 156 contiguous ms (40 time points) survived a paired-samples t-test 
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Upon closer inspection of patterns of MFC–OCC synchrony in 
different conditions, we found that when subjects committed either 
conscious or unconscious errors in the previous trial, MFC–OCC 
synchrony signiﬁ  cantly increased, both before the trial started and 
throughout the trial (with the exception of the time of the peak 
synchrony, around 200 ms post-stimulus; see Figure 2B). A 3 (con-
dition) × 3 (time window: pre-trial, peak synchrony, post-trial; see 
Materials and Methods) repeated-measures ANOVA conﬁ  rmed the 
signiﬁ  cant main effects of condition (F2,28 = 78.5, p < 0.001) and time 
window (F2,28 = 46.78, p < 0.001), and a signiﬁ  cant condition × time 
window interaction (F4,56 = 4.33, p = 0.021), which was driven by 
differences among conditions being smaller immediately following 
stimulus onset (100 to 300 ms). During the pre-stimulus period, 
MFC–OCC synchrony was signiﬁ  cantly stronger for trials following 
unconscious errors compared to trials following Go trials (t14 = 8.1, 
p < 0.001), and for trials following conscious errors compared to 
trials following Go trials (t14 = 8.5,  p <  0.001). Trials following 
conscious errors also had signiﬁ  cantly stronger synchrony com-
pared to trials following unconscious errors (t14 = 6.1, p < 0.001). 
The pattern of results was not affected by our choice of frequency 
band, because similar effects were observed when using narrower 
frequency ranges (2–5 Hz; data not shown).
One potential alternative explanation of changes in phase syn-
chrony is that with increased oscillation power, phase values are 
better estimated, and this may spuriously increase phase  synchrony. 
However, such an account does not explain our ﬁ  ndings: There 
was no signiﬁ  cant main effect of or interaction with condition 
with occipital oscillation power (p’s > 0.5), nor was there a main 
effect of condition with MFC power (F2,28 = 2.57,  p = 0.115). 
There was a time window × condition interaction for MFC power 
(F4,56 = 15.28, p < 0.001), which was driven by increased power fol-
lowing   conscious error trials (t14 = 4.2, p = 0.001) (see Figure 3). 
This was due to enhanced MFC activity during conscious response 
errors on the preceding trial (the error-related negativity); indeed, 
the response on the previous trial occurred on average around 
1500 ms before stimulus onset of the current trial.
The alternative explanation of power driving phase synchrony 
differences also predicts that individual differences in power would 
be correlated with individual differences in synchrony. However, we 
found no evidence for such an effect: The difference in inter-site 
phase synchrony between unconscious errors and Go trials was 
not signiﬁ  cantly correlated with the difference in power between 
these conditions at MFC (Spearman’s rho: r = 0.089, p = 0.75) or 
OCC (r = −0.07, p = 0.79) sites; correlations between power and 
synchrony were also not signiﬁ  cantly correlated when comparing 
trials following conscious errors and Go trials at MFC (r = −0.09, 
p = 0.73)  or  OCC  (r = 0.14,  p = 0.60)  sites.  Further,  inter-site 
synchrony did not correlate with OCC or MFC power in any 
condition independently (not computing condition differences) 
(all p’s > 0.35). The lack of complementary effects in power or 
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 signiﬁ  cant power-synchrony correlations demonstrate that there 
is information available in the synchrony across sites beyond what 
is available at either site alone.
This set of analyses demonstrated that oscillatory synchrony 
between MFC and OCC increases following conscious and uncon-
scious errors, extending several seconds after the error into the 
following trial. These analyses were anatomically constrained 
according to our a priori hypotheses regarding the roles of medial 
prefrontal and occipital cortices in the visually cued Go/No-Go 
task; in the next set of analyses, we examined the topographical 
distribution of post-error oscillatory functional connectivity.
TOPOGRAPHICAL ANALYSES OF PHASE SYNCHRONY
To examine the more global spatial distribution of these effects, we 
computed inter-site synchrony between MFC and all other elec-
trodes, and between OCC and all other electrodes, for each condition 
and for the three time windows of interest (pre-trial, peak syn-
chrony, and post-trial). To remove global patterns of inter-regional 
synchrony, we subtracted seeded synchrony maps during Go trials 
following Go trials, from those during Go trials following uncon-
scious and conscious errors. As seen in Figures 4A,B, synchrony 
between OCC and prefrontal regions was signiﬁ  cantly greater dur-
ing trials following both unconscious and conscious errors com-
pared to trials following Go trials; similarly, synchrony between 
MFC and occipital regions was signiﬁ  cantly greater following errors 
compared to following Go trials. To threshold these maps statisti-
cally, a paired-samples t-test was conducted at each electrode across 
subjects; electrodes with synchrony differences that were not sig-
niﬁ  cant at p < 2.22 × 10−5 (0.001 with Bonferroni correction for 45 
electrode pairs) had their values set to zero (gray color). MFC–OCC 
synchrony differences were prominent pre-trial and post-trial; in 
contrast, strong topographical differences were not observed during 
the time of stimulus-related activity (100–300 ms).
These ﬁ  ndings conﬁ  rm the speciﬁ  city of long-range, prefrontal-
occipital synchrony following unconscious and conscious errors. 
As seen in Figure 4C, CSD transform (see Materials and Methods) 
was successful at minimizing the effects of volume conduction; 
when averaging across conditions, phase synchrony was strong only 
with the electrodes used for pooling, and was minimal even with 
neighboring electrodes.
DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCES ESTIMATED FROM SPECTRAL 
GRANGER CAUSALITY
In our next set of analyses, we used spectral Granger causality to 
estimate the directional inﬂ  uence of the MFC–OCC interactions. 
Go trials following errors had signiﬁ  cantly enhanced pre-trial 
MFC → OCC directional synchrony compared to trials following 
Go trials (Figure 5A). A 3 (condition) × 3 (time window) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed a signiﬁ  cant main effect of condition 
(F2,28 = 9.58, p = 0.003), and no effect of or interaction with time 
window (p’s > 0.4). Follow-up t-tests conﬁ  rmed that during the pre-
trial time window, unconscious (t14 = 2.64, p = 0.019) and conscious 
(t14 = 3.6, p = 0.003) errors elicited greater MFC → OCC direc-
tional synchrony compared to Go trials. In contrast, OCC → MFC 
directional synchrony was not statistically signiﬁ  cantly modulated 
by events in the previous trial (F2,28 = 2.62, p = 0.12). There was a 
main effect of time, with OCC → MFC directional synchrony being 
maximal in the 100–300 ms time window (F2,28 = 5.27, p = 0.03; 
see Figure 5B).
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FIGURE 4 | Topographical analyses of oscillatory phase synchrony reveal 
spatial distribution of frontal-occipital connectivity following 
unconscious and conscious errors. In these analyses, phase synchrony 
between the MFC seed and every other electrode (top row of A and B), and 
between the OCC seed and every other electrode (bottom row of A and B) 
was calculated; differences between trials following unconscious errors and 
Go trials (A) and between trials following conscious errors and Go trials (B) are 
plotted. Electrodes with differences not statistically signiﬁ  cant at 
p < 2.22 × 10−5 had their values set to 0 (gray color). It can be seen that the 
MFC seed was signiﬁ  cantly more strongly synchronized with occipital regions, 
and that the OCC seed was signiﬁ  cantly more strongly synchronized with 
frontal regions, following unconscious and conscious errors. (C) Synchrony 
with MFC and OCC seeds when averaging across all time windows and 
conditions. These plots show that there is minimal contribution of volume 
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Further ANOVAs conﬁ  rmed that during the pre-trial period, 
there was a signiﬁ  cant  directionality × condition  interaction 
(F2,28 = 7.17,  p = 0.01),  such  that  MFC → OCC  synchrony  was 
characterized by a signiﬁ  cant increase in synchrony strength from 
trials following correct Go trials, to those following unconscious 
errors, to those following conscious errors (F1,14 = 6.97, p = 0.019) 
(Figure 5C). In contrast, pre-trial OCC → MFC directional syn-
chrony was not signiﬁ  cantly different among the three conditions 
(F1,14 = 2.79, p = 0.11).
These spectral Granger causality analyses revealed both “bottom-
up” (OCC → MFC) and “top-down” (MFC → OCC) directional 
coupling; pre-trial synchrony was dominated by an MFC → OCC 
ﬂ  ow and was signiﬁ  cantly enhanced by conscious and unconscious 
errors on the previous trial. In contrast, OCC → MFC ﬂ  ow was 
strongest shortly after stimulus onset, and was not signiﬁ  cantly 
  modulated by errors in the previous trial. These ﬁ  ndings  are 
  consistent with the idea that the prefrontal cortex uses oscillatory 
synchrony to “instruct” visual cortex to improve sensory  processing. 
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FIGURE 5 | Spectral Granger causality reveals both top-down 
(MFC → OCC) directed inﬂ  uence, which was signiﬁ  cantly increased 
following unconscious and conscious errors, and bottom-up 
(OCC → MFC) inﬂ  uence, which was strongest during stimulus 
presentation and was not signiﬁ  cantly modulated by events in the 
previous trial. (A) Time-frequency plots for each condition for MFC → OCC 
directed synchrony (top row) and OCC → MFC directed synchrony (bottom 
row). Deeper red colors indicate that more variance in OCC (top) or MFC 
(bottom) can be explained by variance in MFC (top) or OCC (bottom) in each 
frequency band. (B) Line plots (average from 2–12 Hz) demonstrate time 
courses of directed synchrony effects. (C) Difference maps between trials 
following unconscious errors and Go trials (left side) and between trials 
following conscious errors and Go trials (right side) demonstrates time-
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We therefore hypothesized that pre-trial top-down directed syn-
chrony should predict the strength of subsequent bottom-up 
directed synchrony.
To test this, we regressed pre-trial MFC → OCC directed syn-
chrony on peak OCC  →  MFC directed synchrony. We found 
signiﬁ  cant positive relations in all conditions, indicating that indi-
viduals with stronger pre-trial MFC → OCC directed   synchrony 
had stronger OCC → MFC directed synchrony  during subsequent 
stimulus presentation (Figure 6A). This was conﬁ  rmed using robust 
regression (t13: 2.91, 2.1, and 2.22; p-values: 0.01, 0.05, and 0.04 
for trials following Go, conscious errors, and unconscious errors). 
These effects were not due to an alternative explanation of global 
individual differences in synchrony, because the strength of pre-
trial OCC → MFC synchrony did not predict the strength of peak 
synchrony MFC → OCC synchrony (all p’s > 0.17) (Figure 6A).
TOP-DOWN SYNCHRONY STRENGTH PREDICTS 
INHIBITION PERFORMANCE
In our ﬁ   nal set of analyses, we examined the link between 
MFC–OCC oscillatory phase synchrony and behavioral perform-
ance. We computed a unitary performance measure that takes into 
account both speed (response times on correctly responded Go 
trials) and accuracy (errors on No-Go trials). For each subject, 
we divided the average of Go trial response times by conscious 
No-Go inhibition rate (see Materials and Methods); thus, subjects 
with lower numbers are better performers. We then correlated this 
efﬁ  ciency measure with oscillatory phase synchrony, and found 
that subjects with stronger MFC–OCC phase synchrony during 
Go trials following conscious errors performed signiﬁ  cantly better 
on the task (Figure 6B) (Spearman’s rho: −0.56, −0.63, and −0.74, 
p-values: 0.03, 0.01, and 0.002, for pre-trial, peak synchrony, and 
post-trial). These correlations remained signiﬁ  cant when excluding 
the possible outlier from the correlations (p-values: 0.02, 0.01, 0.01). 
As seen in Figure 6B inset, synchrony-performance correlations 
became increasingly negative from Go trials following Go trials, to 
those following unconscious errors, to those following conscious 
errors. We also computed correlations between MFC–OCC syn-
chrony and post-error reaction time slowing, but no correlations 
were signiﬁ  cant (all p’s > 0.2). No correlations between MFC–OCC 
synchrony and average reaction time on Go trials (not scaled by 
inhibition rate) were signiﬁ  cant (all p’s > 0.23). In other words, the 
strength of MFC–OCC phase synchrony predicted task perform-
ance, but was not correlated with overall motor speed.
GRANGER CAUSALITY ESTIMATES WITH LATERAL PFC
Because the lateral PFC has also been implicated in cognitive con-
trol (Kerns et al., 2004), we additionally examined whether lateral 
PFC may play a role in guiding top-down control following errors 
(Figure 7A). For these analyses, we pooled electrodes AF4, F4, and 
FC6. In general, results from spectral Granger causality analyses with 
lateral PFC → OCC were in the same direction but weaker compared 
to MFC → OCC (Figure 7B). Indeed, there was no statistically robust 
effect of condition (F2,28 = 3.6, p = 0.064), time (F2,28 = 0.70, p = 0.449), 
or condition × time interaction (F4,56 = 2.78, p = 0.09). Further, when 
directly comparing the MFC → OCC and lateral PFC → OCC causal 
inﬂ  uence estimates, we found a signiﬁ  cant main effect of “region” 
(stronger MFC → OCC casual inﬂ  uence than lateral PFC → OCC 
causal inﬂ  uence) (F1,14 = 13.6, p = 0.002) and a region × condition 
interaction (F2,28 = 5.27, p = 0.014), which was driven by directed syn-
chrony increasing for Go trials following Go trials, Go trials following 
unconscious errors, and go trials following conscious errors.
In our next set of analyses, we computed Granger causality 
between MFC and lateral PFC (Figure 7C). Here we found that 
the causal inﬂ  uence of lateral PFC → MFC was stronger than that 
from MFC → lateral PFC (F1,14 = 13.39, p = 0.003), although the 
causal inﬂ  uence was not signiﬁ  cantly different among conditions 
(F2,28 = 1.1, p = 0.335). In contrast, the MFC → lateral PFC causal 
estimates were signiﬁ  cantly different among conditions (F2,28 = 4.61, 
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FIGURE 6 | Top-down synchrony predicts stimulus-related bottom-up 
synchrony and task performance. (A) Subjects with stronger pre-stimulus 
MFC → OCC directed synchrony also had stronger peak synchrony (100–300 ms) 
OCC → MFC directed synchrony. This was statistically signiﬁ  cant in all conditions 
(left panel). In contrast, pre-stimulus OCC → MFC directed synchrony was not 
signiﬁ  cantly correlated with MFC → OCC directed synchrony (right panel), 
demonstrating the speciﬁ  city of pre-trial top-down control. (B) Subjects with 
stronger MFC–OCC phase synchrony performed signiﬁ  cantly better on the task 
(using a unitary performance measure that takes into account both response 
times on Go trials, and inhibition rate; smaller numbers indicate better 
performance). These synchrony-performance correlations were signiﬁ  cant 
following conscious error trials, and increased in magnitude from Go trials 
following Go trials, to Go trials following unconscious errors, to Go trials following 
conscious errors (see inset; asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁ  cance at p < 0.05).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 54  |  9
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FIGURE 7 | Synchrony with lateral PFC (LPFC). (A) LPFC oscillatory phase 
synchrony with OCC (left) and MFC (right) averaged over conditions. 
(B) Spectral Granger causality estimates between LPFC and OCC. 
Differences among conditions were only marginally signiﬁ  cant, and 
MFC → OCC directed synchrony was signiﬁ  cantly stronger than was 
LPFC → OCC directed synchrony. (C) Spectral Granger causality 
demonstrates strong activation ﬂ  ow from LPFC → MFC, which was not 
signiﬁ  cantly different according to condition. In contrast, MFC → LPFC 
directed synchrony was relatively weaker, but was signiﬁ  cantly different 
across conditions, in a manner similar to that observed for MFC → OCC.
DISCUSSION
Learning to adapt behavior following mistakes is critical to our 
biological and social survival in a fast-paced, ever-changing 
world. Although considerable evidence points to a role of the 
MFC in detecting errors or negative feedback and adapting sub-
sequent performance (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a; Yeung et al., 
2004; Carter and van Veen, 2007; Cohen, 2008), less is known 
about the mechanisms by which the prefrontal cortex is able to 
adapt performance. Our results suggest that at least one mecha-
nism by which MFC adapts performance following errors is by 
engaging top-down control mechanisms to increase the tuning 
or efﬁ  ciency of stimulus processing (Egner, 2008). This top-down 
control might be expressed through synchronized electrophysi-
ological oscillations. This is consistent with, and offers a neu-
robiologically plausible mechanism for, previous neuroimaging 
work suggesting that prefrontal cognitive control mechanisms 
amplify cortical responses to task relevant information in sensory 
cortex (Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Crottaz-Herbette and Menon, 
2006; Scerif et al., 2006).
Long-range synchronized oscillations are thought to reﬂ  ect a 
mechanism by which spatially disparate neural networks become 
functionally connected, and neural activities across regions are coor-
dinated (Engel et al., 2001; Fries et al., 2007). Oscillatory synchrony 
between widespread brain regions has been linked to conﬂ  ict/error 
processing (Cavanagh et al., 2009), learning (Popescu et al., 2009), 
decision-making (Pesaran et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Gaillard 
et al., 2009), visual priming (Ghuman et al., 2008), and memory 
retrieval (Summerﬁ  eld and Mangels, 2005). The present ﬁ  ndings 
provide novel evidence that such long-range communication may 
underlie a cognitive control process by which top-down regulation 
over sensory regions is triggered by response errors. The speciﬁ  city 
of this mechanism to error adaptation per se (as opposed to more 
general attentional or cognitive control processes) remains to be 
tested in future studies.
Spectral Granger causality revealed separable top-down and 
bottom-up directional synchrony. Bottom-up (OCC  → MFC) 
directional coupling was strongest immediately following the onset 
of the visual stimulus, whereas top-down (MFC → OCC) direc-
tional coupling was strong before the trial began, and again from 
500 to 1400 ms following stimulus onset. Interestingly, top-down 
directional coupling was observed in a relatively lower frequency 
range whereas bottom-up directional coupling was additionally 
observed in higher frequencies (alpha, around 8–13 Hz). This ﬁ  nd-
ing is consistent with electrophysiological recordings in monkeys 
(Buschman and Miller, 2007), which showed that bottom-up (in 
that report, parietal → prefrontal) synchronization occurs in a 
higher frequency band compared to top-down synchronization. 
Although there are several differences between our study and 
theirs (experimental design, species, recording site, etc.), together 
these ﬁ  ndings suggest that different kinds of information (e.g., 
bottom-up vs. top-down) may be transferred using different 
frequency bands.
Our results suggest that cognitive control is realized, at least in 
part, through MFC–mediated enhancement of sensory process-
ing. Signals generated in the MFC may travel to early visual sen-
sory regions via the parietal cortex, inferior temporal cortex, the 
thalamus, the superior colliculus, or other subcortical regions 
p = 0.021; no interaction with time, p = 0.39). In other words, a 
robust ﬂ  ow of activity travels from lateral PFC to MFC, but only 
is the information ﬂ  owing from MFC to lateral PFC signiﬁ  cantly 
different among conditions.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 54  |  10
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(Shipp, 2004; Corbetta et al., 2008). However, enhancement of 
the relevant stimulus domain is not the only means of adapta-
tion thought to reside in the PFC’s toolbox. Previous modeling 
work has suggested that adjusting the response threshold after 
errors/conﬂ  ict may account for some post-error/conﬂ  ict con-
trol mechanisms (Botvinick et al., 2001; Nieuwenhuis and Yeung, 
2005). In our experiment, as in others (Egner and Hirsch, 2005), 
we ﬁ  nd that top-down biasing signals on visual cortex may be 
most relevant for post-error adaptation. In part, this may be 
due to the fact that the conscious gray No-Go cues are difﬁ  cult 
to perceive, whereas there is no ambiguity of the meaning of 
the No-Go stimulus in terms of response inhibition. That is, in 
our experiment, increasing the response threshold after errors 
may not improve performance, but better perceiving the No-
Go stimulus will. Visual versus response selection processes may 
occur independently but partially serially, which would mean 
that longer visual processing leads to longer response times, 
even if response selection is not affected be different processes 
(Woodman et al., 2008).
Relatedly, amygdala activity is enhanced (perhaps under control 
of rostral cingulate zone within the MFC) when emotional responses 
must be controlled (Etkin et al., 2006), and extrastriate responses 
to attended stimuli are enhanced by the prefrontal cortex (Barcelo 
et al., 2000; Pessoa et al., 2003). Together, these ﬁ  ndings suggest 
that modulating response thresholds may be only one of several 
strategies for realizing cognitive control-based adaptations.
Interestingly, this top-down control mechanism is acti-
vated even in absence of conscious awareness that an errone-
ous response was made to an unconscious No-Go cue. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that unconscious errors or conﬂ  ict can 
increase activity in the MFC (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Hester 
et al., 2005; Endrass et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2007; Ursu et al., 
2009). However, the implications of such unconsciously trig-
gered activity increases have thus far remained unknown. Some 
researchers have suggested that such unconscious errors do not 
induce post-error or post-conﬂ   ict performance adjustments 
(Nieuwenhuis et  al., 2001; Kunde, 2003; Endrass et  al., 2007; 
Klein et al., 2007), although it is possible that the magnitude of 
the effect is relatively subtle. Importantly, our EEG synchrony 
results demonstrate that unconscious errors are able to activate 
a top-down control mechanism. This provides an important new 
window into the extent to which unconscious processes can affect 
high-level cognitive control processes.
The behavioral and neural oscillation results suggests that 
unconscious errors do not trigger adaptive control processes as 
strongly as do conscious errors (e.g. 3 vs. 20 ms post-error slow-
ing). This may be due to differences in how conscious and uncon-
scious stimuli are processed in the human brain, as well as to the 
design of our study. Masked (unconscious) stimuli can be deeply 
processed in the brain (for a review, see Kouider and Dehaene, 
2007), including in the prefrontal cortex (Lau and Passingham, 
2007; van Gaal et al., 2008), and can trigger speciﬁ  c behaviors. 
However, the strength, life-time and scope of processing of masked 
stimuli is generally lower than that of conscious (unmasked) stim-
uli (Greenwald et al., 1996; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Dehaene 
and Naccache, 2001; Kunde, 2003). One reason for this is that in 
masking studies, the unconscious stimulus is generally presented 
for less time, or is followed by a mask after a shorter period of 
time than is the conscious stimulus. In this case, the conscious 
signal has more time to be processed, and this may determine 
the neural   propagation extent (Lau and Passingham, 2007; Lau, 
2009) and the impact on behavior (Vorberg et al., 2003). Thus, 
although in the present experiment, conscious error adaptations 
were stronger than unconscious error adaptations, we are not able 
to determine whether this difference was due to the nature of 
conscious   awareness, or the depth of processing (due to different 
intervals before the mask appeared).
It may seem surprising that MFC–OCC synchrony was sus-
tained over an unusually long time window (1–2 s); results from 
masked priming studies suggest that the effects of unconscious 
stimuli on behavior and brain activity are ephemeral, and typi-
cally decay within ∼500 ms (Greenwald et al., 1996; Rossetti, 
1998; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). Our results demonstrate 
that not only do unconscious errors enhance activity over MFC, 
they also activate top-down tonic control processes that extend 
over several seconds, even following the Go cue in the current 
trial. The duration of this effect is consistent with recent stud-
ies showing that masked (unconscious) words modulate neu-
ral activity up to approximately 1 s after stimulus presentation 
(Naccache et al., 2005; Gaillard et al., 2009). Even longer effects 
of unconscious priming (several minutes) have been reported, 
for example in the “mere exposure” effect (Elliott and Dolan, 
1998; Gaillard et al., 2007). The combination of these results 
suggests that unconscious information can inﬂ  uence cognitive 
and neural processes for longer periods of time than previously 
thought. This adds to the ongoing debate about the neural foun-
dations of conscious and unconscious information processing 
(Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2006; Kouider and 
Dehaene, 2007).
Although MFC plays a prominent role in adaptive behavior, 
error processing, and cognitive control (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a; 
Carter and van Veen, 2007), other prefrontal regions also contrib-
ute to executive functioning, including lateral prefrontal cortex. 
Patterns of synchrony between OCC and a pooled right lateral 
prefrontal group (electrodes AF4, F4, and FC6) were somewhat 
similar to OCC synchrony with MFC, but overall less robust. Lateral 
PFC → OCC directed synchrony was generally weaker compared 
to MFC → OCC, and was only marginally signiﬁ  cantly (p = 0.064) 
affected by condition. Further, MFC → lateral PFC directed syn-
chrony was signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uenced by condition. This suggests that 
MFC plays a larger role than lateral PFC in   directing top-down 
synchrony over visual processing, consistent with previous stud-
ies implicating a strong role for MFC in implementing top-down 
control (Taylor et al., 2007).
Our ﬁ  ndings cannot be due to differences in overall oscillation 
power, because the effects in the power domain did not mirror the 
MFC–OCC synchrony effects, nor were power changes correlated 
with inter-site synchrony. The ﬁ  ndings were also not related to the 
number of trials in each condition, because trial count was uncor-
related with synchrony strength across subjects (all p’s > 0.57), 
and the pattern of results was not different when randomly select-
ing trials in each condition according to the number of trials in 
the smallest condition: We still found a signiﬁ  cant main effect of 
 condition (F2,28 = 8.1, p = 0.002) and time (F2,28 = 35.8, p < 0.001), Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 54  |  11
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which was driven by the same pattern of increasing MFC–OCC 
synchrony for Go trials following Go trials, Go trials following 
unconscious No-Go errors, and Go trials following conscious 
No-Go errors. More generally, this dissociation between inter-
site synchrony and power demonstrates that important insights 
into neurocognitive function can be gained from an examination 
of the interactions among brain regions; in some cases, limit-
ing analyses to average activity in localized brain regions may 
miss important information. This set of analyses also revealed 
an important advantage of electrophysiological measures such 
as EEG and MEG over functional MRI; functional MRI cannot 
resolve interactions on such short time scales, nor can it be used to 
determine oscillatory characteristics of brain activity (Axmacher 
et al., 2009).
In conclusion, we have provided novel evidence that the prefron-
tal cortex utilizes oscillatory synchrony as a means of enacting top-
down control over sensory regions to enhance stimulus processing. 
This mechanism is engaged even in absence of conscious awareness 
that an error was made.
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